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Abstract
Traditional optimization models assume a central decision maker who optimizes
a global system performance measure. However, problem data is often distributed
among several agents, and agents take autonomous decisions. This gives incentives
for strategic behavior of agents, possibly leading to sub-optimal system performance.
Furthermore, in dynamic environments, machines are locally dispersed and administra-
tively independent. Examples are found both in business and engineering applications.
We investigate such issues for a parallel machine scheduling model where jobs arrive
online over time. Instead of centrally assigning jobs to machines, each machine imple-
ments a local sequencing rule and jobs decide for machines themselves. In this context,
we introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than
the classical dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. Our
main result is a polynomial time, online mechanism that —assuming rational behavior
of jobs— results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive with respect to
the maximal social welfare. This is only slightly worse than state-of-the-art algorithms
with central coordination.
1 Introduction
Scheduling arriving jobs online on a set of parallel machines is a key issue both in business
and engineering applications. Examples can be found in service operations management
and distributed computing. The problem has been well studied in the traditional setting
where a central decision maker strives to optimize a global system performance measure
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and is assumed to have access to all relevant data. However, in the environments men-
tioned above, data is usually not centrally available, but is distributed among selfish job
owners, called agents. This gives incentives for strategic behavior of agents, possibly leading
to sub-optimal system performance. This challenge calls for mechanism design to align the
individual goals of selfish agents with overall system performance. On the other hand, in
dynamic environments like distributed computing, machines are locally dispersed and ad-
ministratively independent and may be dynamically added to or removed from the system.
A typical example are web servers, where content and/or computational resources are nowa-
days distributed over the whole world and service requests need to be allocated online. In
such settings, it is indispensable to keep communication complexity low and to design local
protocols that machines have to adopt rather than centrally coordinating the distribution
of jobs over machines. This has been observed, for example, in the context of analyzing the
price of anarchy e.g. by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, and Nanavati (2004), Immorlica, Li,
Mirrokni, and Schulz (2005) and Azar, Jain, and Mirrokni (2008). In this paper, we define
decentralized online mechanisms that account for all mentioned requirements.
More specifically, we study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling
problem to minimize the total weighted completion time — P | rj |
∑
wj Cj in the notation
of Graham, Lawler, Lenstra, and Rinnooy Kan (1979) — from a game theoretic, or strategic
perspective. In the online version, jobs j with processing times pj and weights wj arrive
online over time at release times rj, and at any given time the scheduler does not know if, or
what type of jobs are still to appear in the future. The classical goal in online optimization
is to design online algorithms that are competitive, that is, even though faced with an online
situation, such algorithms compare reasonably well to the optimal offline solution. An online
algorithm is called %-competitive if it always achieves a solution that is not more than a factor
% away from the optimum offline solution. We assume that each job is a selfish agent, and a
job’s release time rj, its processing time pj and its weight wj is only known to the job itself,
but not to the system or any other job. Any job j is interested in being finished as early
as possible, and the weight wj represents j’s cost per unit waiting time. While jobs may
strategically report false values (r˜j, p˜j, w˜j) in order to be scheduled earlier, the total social
welfare is maximized whenever the weighted sum of completion times
∑
wj Cj is minimized.
Next to the game theoretic challenge due to selfishly behaving jobs, distributed systems
ask for low communication complexity and local protocols that machines have to commit
to rather than centralized coordination. Our goal is to meet the following requirements,
which we refer to as decentralization: Jobs may communicate with machines, but neither
do jobs communicate with each other, nor do machines communicate with each other. In
particular, there is no central scheduling unit hosting all the data of the problem. This leads
to a setting where the jobs themselves must select the machine to be processed on, and any
machine sequences the jobs according to a (known) local sequencing policy. Such a model
was lately also discussed by Azar, Jain, and Mirrokni (2008).
Our goal is to set up an online mechanism that copes with the strategic and decentralized
setting while yielding a reasonable overall performance with respect to the total social welfare,
that is, minimize
∑
wj Cj. The mechanism should motivate the jobs to reveal their private
information truthfully. In addition, as we require decentralization, each machine needs to
be equipped with a local sequencing policy, and jobs must be induced to select the machines
in such a way that the objective
∑
wj Cj does not deteriorate. The online algorithm with
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the currently best known competitive ratio by Correa and Wagner (2005) crucially requires
central coordination to distribute jobs over machines. Instead, we build upon an approach
by Megow, Uetz, and Vredeveld (2006), developed for a setting with stochastic job durations,
which turns out to be appropriate for the decentralized setting that we aim at.
Related Work. As computational complexity is concerned, the scheduling problem
P | rj |
∑
wj Cj is well-understood in the non-strategic setting with centralized coordination.
First, scheduling to minimize the weighted sum of completion times with release dates is
NP-hard, even in the off-line case on a single machine. For more than one machine, the
problem is NP-hard even if all release dates are zero (Lenstra, Rinnooy Kan, and Brucker
1977). In the online setting, it is well known that no online algorithm for the single machine
problem can be better than 2-competitive (Hoogeveen and Vestjens 1996) regardless of the
question whether or not P=NP. On parallel machines, no online algorithm can be better
than 1.309-competitive, and this bound can be improved for a specific number of machines
(Vestjens 1997). The best possible algorithm for the single machine case is 2-competitive and
thus matches the lower bound (Anderson and Potts 2004). For the parallel machine setting,
the currently best known online algorithm is 2.62-competitive (Correa and Wagner 2005),
improving upon an earlier algorithm by Megow and Schulz (2004). The algorithm by Megow
et al. (2006) is a modification of the latter. Here, jobs are locally sequenced according to an
online variant of the well known WSPT rule (Smith 1956), and arriving jobs are assigned to
machines in order to minimize an expression that approximates the (expected) increase of
the objective value. The algorithms by Megow and Schulz (2004) and Megow et al. (2006)
both achieve a competitive ratio of 3.281.
Mechanism design in combination with the design of approximation algorithms for schedul-
ing problems has been studied, e.g., by Nisan and Ronen (2001) and Archer and Tardos
(2001). The models in these papers are such that the processing time of a job depends on
the machine that processes the job (unrelated and related machine scheduling, respectively).
Furthermore, the machines are the selfishly behaving parts of the system. Their private
information is the time they need to process the jobs. Among other things, these papers
present mechanisms where rational (selfish) behavior of agents yields equilibrium solutions
that are only a constant factor away from the optimum. A scheduling model that comes
closer to the model that we address has been studied by Porter (2004). He analyzes a single
machine online scheduling problem where the jobs are the selfish agents of the system, and
the private data of each job consists of a release date, its processing time, its weight, and
a deadline. He, too, obtains a mechanism where selfish behavior of agents yields competi-
tive equilibrium solutions. Also Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg, Mahdian, and Parkes (2005) derive
mechanisms for an online single machine model with job agents, where jobs are available
only within certain time windows.
Decentralization for scheduling models with job agents is regarded in the papers by
Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, and Nanavati (2004), Immorlica, Li, Mirrokni, and Schulz
(2005) and Azar, Jain, and Mirrokni (2008). Those papers analyze the price of anarchy
for different local scheduling policies.
Our Contribution. We present a polynomial time, decentralized online mechanism,
called Decentralized Local GreedyMechanism. Thereby we provide also a new algo-
rithm for the non-strategic, centralized setting, inspired by the MinIncrease Algorithm
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of Megow et al. (2006), but improving upon the latter in terms of simplicity. The De-
centralized Local GreedyMechanism is easy to implement and we show that it is
3.281-competitive. This coincides with the performance bound achieved by Megow and
Schulz (2004) for the non-strategic, centralized setting. The currently best known bound
for this setting, however, is 2.62 (Correa and Wagner 2005). Giving up on decentralization,
it is possible to design a 2.62-competitive mechanism on the basis of the Correa-Wagner
algorithm with a dominant strategy equilibrium in which all agents report truthfully. We
discuss the resulting mechanism in Section 6.2.
As usual in mechanism design, the Decentralized Local Greedy Mechanism defines
payments that have to be made by the jobs for being processed. Naturally, we require from
an online mechanism that also the payments are computed online. Hence they can be
completely settled by the time at which a job leaves the system. We also show that the
payments result in a balanced budget. The payments induce rational jobs to truthfully
report about their private data. With respect to release dates and processing times, we can
show that truthfulness is a dominant strategy equilibrium. With respect to the weights,
however, we can only show that truthful reports are myopic best responses (in a sense to
be made precise later). Most importantly, the payments induce the jobs to select ‘the right’
machines, that is, the machines which a centralized mechanism would select in order to
achieve a good competitive ratio. Intuitively, the mechanism uses the payments to mimic a
corresponding Local Greedy online algorithm in the classical (non-strategic, centralized)
parallel machine setting P | rj |
∑
wj Cj. In addition, we show that there does not exist a
payment scheme leading to the same selection of machines where truthful reporting of all
private information is a dominant strategy equilibrium. This is even true, when only the
weight wj is considered private information and pj and rj are publicly known. Hence, for the
decentralized online setting that we consider, it is not clear if a constant competitive ratio
can be achieved by means of a dominant strategy equilibrium of some mechanism — even if
weights are the only private information.
Organization of the Paper. We formalize the model and introduce notation in
Section 2. Especially, we define the notion of a decentralized online scheduling mecha-
nism and the myopic best response equilibrium in that section. In Section 3 the Local
GreedyAlgorithm is defined. In Section 4, this algorithm is adapted to the strategic set-
ting and extended by a payment scheme yielding the Decentralized Local Greedy
Mechanism. Moreover, our main results are presented in that section. We analyze the per-
formance of the resulting mechanism in Section 5. In Section 6, we prove the mentioned
negative result and reflect on mechanisms that have dominant strategy equilibria, giving up
on decentralization. We conclude with a short discussion in Section 7.
2 Model and Notation
The considered problem is online parallel machine scheduling with non-trivial release dates,
with the objective to minimize the weighted sum of completion times, P | rj |
∑
wj Cj. We
are given a set of jobs J = {1, . . . , n}, where each job needs to be processed on any of the
parallel, identical machines from the set M = {1, . . . ,m}. The processing of each job must
not be preempted, and each machine can process at most one job at a time. Each job j is
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viewed as a selfish agent and has the following private information: a release date rj ≥ 0, a
processing time pj > 0, and an indifference cost, or weight, denoted by wj ≥ 0. The release
date denotes the time when the job comes into existence, whereas the weight represents the
cost to a job for one additional unit of time spent waiting. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the jobs are numbered in order of their release dates, i.e., j < k ⇒ rj ≤ rk.
The triple (rj, pj, wj) is also denoted as the type of a job, and we use the shortcut notation
tj = (rj, pj, wj). By T = R+0 × R+ × R+0 we denote the space of possible types of each job.
In the model we analyze, a job j can report an arbitrary weight w˜j 6= wj, an elongated
processing time p˜j ≥ pj (e.g. by adding unnecessary work), and it can artificially delay its
true release time rj to r˜j ≥ rj. We do not allow a job to report a processing time shorter than
the true pj, as this can easily be discovered and punished by the system, e.g. by preempting
the job after the declared processing time p˜j before it is actually finished. Furthermore, we
assume that any job j comes into existence only at its release time rj, thus it does not make
sense that a job reports a release time smaller than the true value rj.
We next introduce the concept of a decentralized online scheduling mechanism. It ac-
counts for the various challenges mentioned in the introduction: It takes into account that
necessary information is not centrally available but has to be communicated from jobs to
machines, while keeping the resulting communication complexity down to a minimum. It
does not use central coordination, but rather defines a protocol according to which machines
process jobs and compute payments that jobs have to make. Our goal will be to find such a
mechanism, where rational jobs’ behavior results in an equilibrium where the social welfare
is not too far from optimum.
Definition 2.1. A decentralized online scheduling mechanism is a procedure that works as
follows.
1. Each job j has a release time rj, but may pretend to come into existence at any time
r˜j ≥ rj. At r˜j, the job communicates to every machine reports w˜j and p˜j.4
2. Machines communicate on the basis of that information a tentative completion time Cˆj
and a tentative payment pˆij.
3. Based on the responses of all machines at time r˜j, the job chooses a machine to be
processed on.
4. There is no communication between machines or between jobs.
5. Machines may revise Cˆj and pˆij only if later another job chooses the same machine,
leading to an ex-post completion time Cj and an ex-post payment pij.
Hereby, we assume that jobs with equal reported release times arrive in some given order
and communicate to machines in that order. Next, we define two important properties of
the payment scheme.
Definition 2.2. If for every job j payments to and from j are only made between time r˜j
and time Cj, then we call the payment scheme an online payment scheme.
4A job could even report different values to different machines. However, we prove existence of equilibria
where the jobs do not make use of that option.
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Definition 2.3. A payment scheme satisfies the balanced budget condition if the payments
made by all jobs sum up to zero, i.e.,
∑
j∈J pij = 0.
One of our goals is to design competitive online mechanisms, which are defined as follows.
Definition 2.4. Let A be an online mechanism that seeks to minimize a certain objective
function. Let VA(I) be the objective value computed by A for a problem instance I and let
VOPT (I) be the offline optimal objective value for I. Then A is called %-competitive if for all
instances I of the problem,
VA(I) ≤ % · VOPT (I) .
The factor % is also called performance ratio of the mechanism.
We assume that the valuation equals vj(Cj , tj) = −wj Cj, such that smaller completion
times are preferred. We furthermore assume quasi-linear utilities, that is, the utility of job j
equals uj(Cj, pij , tj) = vj(Cj , tj) − pij, which is equal to −wj Cj − pij. Unlike in other
mechanism design settings, where jobs always have the option not to participate in the
mechanism and to obtain zero utility, we assume that the jobs have no such option and they
have to be processed on one of the machines.
The communication with machines, and the decision for a particular machine are called
actions of the jobs; they constitute the strategic actions jobs can take in the non-cooperative
game induced by the mechanism. A strategy sj of a job j maps a type tj to an action for
every possible state of the system in which the job is required to take some action. A strategy
profile is a vector (s1, . . . , sn) of strategies, one for each job. Given a mechanism, a strategy
profile, and a realization of types t, we denote by uj(s, t) the (ex-post) utility that agent j
receives.
Definition 2.5. A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) is called a dominant strategy equilibrium
if for all jobs j ∈ J , all types t of the jobs, all strategies s˜−j of the other jobs, and all
strategies s˜j that j could play instead of sj,
uj((sj, s˜−j), t) ≥ uj((s˜j, s˜−j), t) .
The dominant strategy equilibrium is a very sound, yet strong concept, and in many
cases dominant strategy equilibria do not exist; see for example the discussion by Nisan
(2007). Several alternatives have been studied in the literature that weaken the definition
of rational agent behavior, e.g. ex-post Nash equilibria, Bayes-Nash equilibria or myopic
best responses. The latter has for instance been used in auction theory in the context of
combinatorial auctions, see e.g. Parkes (1999) and Parkes and Ungar (2000). There, the
VCG mechanism (where truthful revelation of private information is a dominant strategy
equilibrium) suffers from severe computational difficulties. Instead, an iterative auction with
several rounds is proposed that results in a welfare maximizing allocation of goods if bidders
are myopic. Myopic bidders aim to maximize their utility with respect to current price
and allocation information, rather than taking game theoretic look-ahead to future rounds.
Similarly myopic bidders are assumed by Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) for multi-
item auctions, Bein and Wein (2003) and Gallien and Wein (2005) for procurement auctions
and by Wellman, Walsh, Wurman, and MacKie-Mason (2001) for the allocation of time slots.
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We find this concept appropriate and natural also for our setting. We assume that rational
agents maximize their tentative utility, that is, the utility that a job is communicated upon
arrival at the system. Note that the concept shares with the dominant strategy equilibrium
the property that it does not require any reasoning about other agents’ valuations. In that
sense it is prior-free, which is a desirable property.
Definition 2.6. Given a decentralized, online scheduling mechanism as in Definition 2.1, a
strategy profile s, and type profile t. Let Cˆj and pˆij denote the tentative completion time and
the tentative payment of job j at time r˜j. Then uˆj(s, t) := −Cˆwj − pˆij denotes j’s tentative
utility at time r˜j.
If s and t are clear from the context, we will use uˆj as short notation.
Definition 2.7. A strategy profile (s1, . . . , sn) is called a myopic best response equilibrium,
if for all jobs j ∈ J , all types t of the jobs, all strategies s˜−j of the other jobs and all strategies
s˜j that j could play instead of sj,
uˆj((sj, s˜−j), t) ≥ uˆj((s˜j, s˜−j), t).
Notice that the only difference in the definitions of the two equilibria is the utility that
agents are concerned with: In the dominant strategy equilibrium, it is the ex-post utility that
drives an agent, while in the weaker myopic best response equilibrium, it is the immediate
utility that is observable at the moment in time where the agent chooses an action.
Proposition 2.1. For any decentralized online scheduling mechanism with online payment
scheme, every dominant strategy equilibrium is a myopic best response equilibrium.
Proof. In a dominant strategy equilibrium, job j’s strategy maximizes j’s ex-post utility for
all possible strategies of the other jobs. In a decentralized online scheduling mechanism with
online payment scheme, there is always a strategy of the other jobs s−j such that j’s tentative
utility equals j’s ex-post utility (e.g., jobs arriving later than j can choose to delay their
arrival behind j’s completion time). Then none of these jobs can change j’s completion time,
and if the payment scheme is online, neither can they influence j’s payment5. Consequently,
j’s tentative utility must be maximized in any dominant strategy equilibrium, too.
Hence, the class of myopic best response equilibria is a larger class of equilibria than
dominant strategy equilibria, and we will see later that it is indeed a strictly larger class.
Finally, notice that jobs will also have to select a machine according to Definition 2.1.
This additional action of jobs has been introduced to distinguish between decentralized and
centralized scheduling mechanisms. One might argue that one can nevertheless make use of
the revelation principle, which asserts that an arbitrary mechanism that has an equilibrium,
for example a dominant strategy equilibrium, always induces a direct revelation mechanism
with an equilibrium of the same strength. Thus questions with respect to the existence of
mechanisms with a particular equilibrium can be answered by restricting to direct revelation
mechanisms. However, not all direct revelation mechanisms can be decentralized in the
5If m > 1 it is not necessary to require the payment scheme to be online. The tentative utility equals the
ex-post utility, e.g., if later jobs choose a different machine than j.
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sense of Definition 2.1. For example, we cannot decentralize the algorithm in Correa and
Wagner (2005), because it crucially requires a central queue for the jobs. Hence, given
that we aim at decentralized mechanisms, we cannot make use of the revelation principle.
Equilibria of decentralized online scheduling mechanisms, however, give rise to a particular
form of revelation mechanisms, namely mechanisms in which jobs report their types to so-
called proxy agents, each of them representing exactly one job, and behaving on behalf of
the jobs as prescribed by the equilibrium strategy. But introducing proxy agents requires a
trustworthy mediator, which can be seen as a hidden form of centralization.
2.1 Critical jobs
For convenience of presentation, we make the following assumption for the main part of the
paper. Fix some constant 0 < α ≤ 1 (α will be discussed later). Let us call job j critical
if rj < αpj. Intuitively, a job is critical if it is long and appears comparably early in the
system. The assumption we make is that such critical jobs do not exist, that is
rj ≥ α pj for all jobs j ∈ J .
This assumption is a tribute to the desired performance guarantee, and in fact, it is well
known that critical jobs must not be scheduled early to achieve constant performance ratios
(see Anderson and Potts 2004 and Megow and Schulz 2004). However, the assumption is
only made due to cosmetic reasons. In the following we first define an algorithm and a
mechanism on the refined type space, where all jobs are non-critical. In Section 5.1, we
extend the type space and slightly adapt the mechanism. The adapted mechanism can
handle critical jobs without sacrificing the performance bound, while all desired properties
concerning the strategic behavior of the jobs are preserved.
3 The Local Greedy Algorithm
For the time being, we assume that the job characteristics, namely release date rj, processing
time pj and indifference cost wj, are given.
The idea of the MinIncrease algorithm of Megow et al. (2006) is that each machine
uses (the online version of) the well known WSPT rule (Smith 1956) locally; an idea that
we adopt also here. More precisely, each machine implements a priority queue containing
the not yet scheduled jobs that have been assigned to the machine. The queue is organized
according to WSPT, that is, jobs with higher ratio wj/pj have higher priority. In case of ties,
jobs with lower index have higher priority. As soon as the machine falls idle, the currently
first job from this priority queue is scheduled (if any). Given this local scheduling policy on
each of the machines, any arriving job is assigned to that machine where the increase in the
objective
∑
wj Cj is minimal.
In the formulation of the algorithm, we utilize some shortcut notation. We let j → i
denote the fact that job j is assigned to machine i. Let Sj be the time when job j eventually
starts being processed. For any job j, H(j) denotes the set of jobs that have higher priority
than j, H(j) = {k ∈ J |wkpj > wjpk} ∪ {k ≤ j |wkpj = wjpk}. Note that H(j) includes j,
too. Similarly, L(j) = J \H(j) denotes the set of jobs with lower priority. At a given point
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τ in time, machine i might be busy processing a job. We let bi(τ) denote the remaining
processing time of that job at time τ , i.e., at time τ machine i will be blocked during bi(τ)
units of time for new jobs. If machine i is idle at time τ , we let bi(τ) = 0. With these
definitions, if job j arrives are time rj and is assigned to machine i, the increase of the
objective
∑
wj Cj is
z(j, i) := wj
[
rj + bi(rj) +
∑
k∈H(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk≥rj
pk + pj
]
+ pj
∑
k∈L(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk>rj
wk .
Algorithm 1: Local Greedy algorithm
Local Sequencing Policy:
When a machine falls idle, it processes the job with highest (WSPT) priority among all jobs
assigned to it.
Assignment:
If job j arrives at time rj , it is assigned to machine ij ∈ argmini∈M z(j, i) with minimum
index.
Clearly, the Local Greedy algorithm still makes use of central coordination. On
the other hand, the WSPT rule can be run locally on every machine and does not require
communication between the machines. Therefore, the Local Greedy algorithm qualifies
for decentralization, which will be done in the next Section.
4 Payments for Myopic Rational Jobs
The payments we introduce can be motivated as follows: A job j pays at the moment of its
placement on one of the machines an amount that compensates the decrease in utility of the
other jobs. The final payment of each job j resulting from this mechanism will then consist
of the immediate payment j has to make when selecting a machine and of the payments
j gets when being displaced by other jobs. Furthermore, the WSPT rule is run locally on
every machine and jobs select a machine themselves. We will prove that utility maximizing
jobs have an incentive to report truthfully and to choose the machine that the Local
GreedyAlgorithm would have selected, too. We will see in the next section that this yields
a constant competitive ratio, given that the jobs behave rationally. The algorithm including
the payments is displayed below. Let here the indices of the jobs be defined according to
the reported release dates, i.e., j < k ⇒ r˜j ≤ r˜k. Let H˜(j) and L˜(j) be defined analogously
to H(j) and L(j) on the basis of the reported weights and processing times. Then for job j,
arriving at time r˜j, the tentative complection time and payment, respectively, at machine i
are
Cˆj(i) = r˜j + bi(r˜j) +
∑
k∈H˜(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk≥r˜j
p˜k + p˜j and pˆij(i) = p˜j
∑
k∈L˜(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk>r˜j
w˜k .
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Algorithm 2: DecentralizedLocal GreedyMechanism
Local Sequencing Policy: When a machine falls idle, it processes the job with highest
(WSPT) priority among all available jobs queuing at this machine.
Assignment:
1. At time r˜j job j arrives and reports weight w˜j and processing time p˜j to all machines.
2. Every machine i informs j about both Cˆj(i) and pˆij(i).
3. Job j chooses a machine ij ∈M . Its tentative utility for being queued at machine i is
uˆj(i) := −wjCˆj(i)− pˆij(i).
4. The job is queued at ij according to WSPT among all currently available jobs on ij
whose processing has not started yet. The payment pˆij(ij) has to be paid by j.
5. The (tentative) completion time for every job k ∈ L˜(j), k → ij , k < j, Sk > r˜j increases
by p˜j due to j ’s presence. As compensation, k receives a payment of w˜kp˜j .
Notice that the payments results in a balanced budget for the scheduler. That is, the
payments paid and received by the jobs sum up to zero, since every arriving job immediately
makes its payment to the jobs that are displaced by it. Also notice that the payments are
online in the sense of Definition 2.2.
Theorem 4.1. Regard any type vector t, any strategy profile s and any job j with report
(r˜j, p˜j, w˜j), and machine choice i˜ ∈M . Then changing the report to (r˜j, p˜j, wj) and choosing
a machine that maximizes tentative utility at time r˜j does not decrease j’s tentative utility.
Proof. We first regard the single machine case, i.e., m = 1. Suppose, at the arrival time
r˜j of job j jobs k1, k2, . . . , kr with corresponding reported processing times p˜1, p˜2, . . . , p˜r and
reported weights w˜1, w˜2, . . . , w˜r are queueing to be processed on the machine, but none of
them has started being processed yet. Without loss of generality let w˜1/p˜1 ≥ w˜2/p˜2 ≥ · · · ≥
w˜r/p˜r. Given the reported processing time p˜j, job j could receive any position in front of,
between or behind the already present jobs in the priority queue by choosing its weight
appropriately. Therefore, it has to decide for every job ks, s ∈ {1, . . . , r}, whether it wants
to be placed in front of ks or not. Displacing ks would increase pˆij(1) by w˜sp˜j, whereas
Cˆj(1) is decreased by p˜s. Thus, j ’s tentative utility changes by wj p˜s − w˜sp˜j if j displaces
ks compared to not displacing ks. Therefore, it is rational for j to displace ks if and only if
wj p˜s − w˜sp˜j > 0, which is equivalent to wj/p˜j > w˜s/p˜s. As the machine schedules according
to WSPT, j is placed at the position that maximizes its tentative utility when reporting wj.
For m > 1, recall that j can select a machine itself. As reporting the truth maximizes
its tentative utility on every single machine, and as j can then choose the machine that
maximizes its tentative utility among all machines, truth-telling and choosing a machine
maximizing uˆj will maximize j ’s tentative utility.
Lemma 4.1. Consider any job j ∈ J . Then for all reports of all other agents as well as all
choices of machines of the other agents, the following is true:
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(a ) If j reports w˜j = wj, then the tentative utility when queued at any of the machines will
be preserved over time, i.e., it equals j’s ex-post utility.
(b ) If j reports w˜j = wj, then selecting the machine that the Local GreedyAlgorithm
would have selected maximizes j’s ex-post utility.
Proof. To see (a), note that whenever j’s tentative completion time changes, j is immediately
compensated for that by a payment. If w˜j = wj then the payment exactly equals the loss
in utility. Claim (b) follows from (a) and the fact that the machine chosen by the Local
Greedy Algorithm maximizes j’s tentative utility.
Theorem 4.1 implies that a myopic agent should report its true weight. Lemma 4.1
implies that such an agent is guaranteed to receive an ex-post utility as high as its tentative
utility. The alternative is gambling: Recall that we defined a restricted communication
paradigm where jobs, upon arrival, are only informed about (tentative) completion times
and (tentative) payments. In particular, jobs do not get to know which jobs are already
queuing at the machines and what reports the already present jobs have made. One can
construct simple examples that demonstrate that overstating or understating the weight
bears the risk of arbitrarily high utility losses in comparison to truthful reporting. More
specifically, if a job j overstates its weight, this can result in a position in front of a job
already present on the chosen machine whose weight over processing time ratio is smaller
than j’s true ratio. The payment j has to make in this case can be arbitrarily higher than the
valuation j gains. Understating the weight can lead to a later job displacing j, but paying to
j arbitrarily less than j’s actual loss in valuation. On the other hand, one can similarly show
that agents also have the chance of arbitrary high utility gains by overstating their weight.
In this light, reporting truthfully becomes particularly attractive for risk-averse agents.
Theorem 4.2. Consider the restricted strategy space where all j ∈ J report w˜j = wj. Then
the strategy profile where all jobs j truthfully report r˜j = rj, p˜j = pj and choose a machine
that maximizes uˆj is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Let us start with m = 1. Suppose w˜j = wj, fix any r˜j and regard any p˜j > pj. Let
uj denote j’s (ex-post) utility when reporting pj truthfully and let u˜j be its (ex-post) utility
for reporting p˜j. As w˜j = wj, the ex-post utility equals in both cases the tentative utility
at decision point r˜j according to Lemma 4.1(a). Let us therefore regard the latter utilities.
Clearly, according to the WSPT-priorities, j’s position in the queue at the machine for report
pj will not be behind its position for report p˜j. Let us divide the jobs already queuing at the
machine upon j’s arrival into three sets: Let J1 = {k ∈ J | k < j, Sk > r˜j, w˜k/p˜k ≥ wj/pj},
J2 = {k ∈ J | k < j, Sk > r˜j, wj/pj > w˜k/p˜k ≥ wj/p˜j} and J3 = {k ∈ J | k < j, Sk >
r˜j, wj/p˜j > w˜k/p˜k}. That is, J1 comprises the jobs that are in front of j in the queue for
both reports, J2 consists of the jobs that are only in front of j when reporting p˜j and J3
includes only jobs that queue behind j for both reports. Therefore, u˜j − uj equals
−
∑
k∈J1∪J2
wj p˜k −
∑
k∈J3
p˜jw˜k − wj p˜j −
(
−
∑
k∈J1
wj p˜k −
∑
k∈J2∪J3
pjw˜k − wjpj
)
=
∑
k∈J2
(pjw˜k − wj p˜k)−
∑
k∈J3
(p˜j − pj)w˜k − wj(p˜j − pj).
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According to the definition of J2, the first term is smaller than or equal to zero. As p˜j > pj,
the whole right hand side becomes non-positive. Therefore u˜j ≤ uj, i.e., truthfully reporting
pj maximizes j’s ex-post utility on a single machine.
Let us now fix w˜j = wj and any p˜j ≥ pj and regard any r˜j > rj. There are two effects that
can occur when arriving later than rj. Firstly, jobs queued at the machine already at time
rj may have been processed or may have started receiving service by time r˜j. But either j
would have had to wait for those jobs anyway or it would have increased its utility at decision
point rj by displacing a job and paying the compensation. So, j cannot gain from this effect
by lying. The second effect is that new jobs have arrived at the machine between rj and r˜j.
Those jobs either delay j’s completion time and j looses the payment it could have received
by arriving earlier. Or the jobs do not delay j’s completion time, but j has to pay the jobs
for displacing them when arriving at r˜j. If j arrived at time rj, it would not have to pay for
displacing such a job. Hence, j cannot gain from this effect either. Thus the tentative utility
at time rj will be at least as large as the one at time r˜j. Therefore, j maximizes its tentative
utility by choosing r˜j = rj. As w˜j = wj, it follows from Lemma 4.1(a) that choosing r˜j = rj
also maximizes the job’s ex-post utility on a single machine.
For m > 1, note that on every machine, the tentative utility of job j at decision point
r˜j is equal to its ex-post utility and that j can select a machine itself that maximizes its
tentative utility and therefore its ex-post utility. Therefore, given that w˜j = wj, a job’s
ex-post utility is maximized by choosing r˜j = rj, p˜j = pj and, according to Lemma 4.1(b),
by choosing the machine that the Local GreedyAlgorithm would have chosen.
Theorem 4.3. Given the types of all jobs, the strategy profile where each job j reports
(r˜j, p˜j, w˜j) = (rj, pj, wj) and chooses a machine maximizing its tentative utility uˆj is a myopic
best response equilibrium.
Proof. Regard job j. According to the proof of Theorem 4.1, uˆj on any machine is maximized
by reporting w˜j = wj for any r˜j and p˜j. According to Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.1(b),
p˜j = pj, r˜j = rj and choosing a machine that maximizes j’s tentative utility at time r˜j
maximize j’s ex-post utility if j truthfully reports w˜j = wj. According to Lemma 4.1(a) this
ex-post utility is equal to uˆj if j reports w˜j = wj. Therefore, any job j maximizes uˆj by
truthful reports and choosing the machine as claimed.
In order to obtain the myopic best response equilibrium, payments paid by an arriving
job j need not necessarily be given to the jobs delayed by j. We formulate this fact as a
Corollary.6
Corollary 4.1. If the Decentralized Local GreedyMechanism is modified such that
payments are collected from jobs, but not given to the other jobs, then truth-telling and choos-
ing a machine that maximizes the tentative utility uˆj is a myopic best response equilibrium.
Proof. According to Theorem 4.1, truthfully reporting wj maximizes j’s tentative utility
for any p˜j and r˜j. Furthermore, similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2 it can be shown that
truthfully reporting the processing time maximizes j’s tentative utility for any r˜j and truthful
6We add an extra proof, since the proof of Theorem 4.3 uses the detour via ex-post utilities, which is not
possible if jobs are not compensated for delays.
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w˜j = wj. Concerning the release date, arriving late at time r˜j instead of rj does not increase
the tentative utility for the following reasons. Jobs that were present at rj are already
finished or have started receiving service or are still waiting at time r˜j. For those jobs, j
either would have had to wait anyway or j could have increased its utility by displacing such
a job and paying the compensation. Jobs that have arrived between time rj and r˜j can only
delay j or increase the amount that j has to pay. In any case, j cannot benefit from arriving
late. Therefore, arriving at rj maximizes j’s tentative utility. This proves the claim.
Although paying jobs when being displaced is not necessary to obtain the equilibrium, it
is desirable for other reasons. First of all, the resulting ex-post payments yield a balanced
budget and in equilibrium, the tentative utility at arrival is preserved and equals the ex-
post utility of every job (Lemma 4.1). Furthermore, paying jobs for their delay results in a
dominant strategy equilibrium in a restricted type space (Theorem 4.2).
5 Performance of the Mechanism
As shown in Section 4, jobs have a motivation to report truthfully about their data. Therefore
we will call a job rational if it truthfully reports wj, pj and rj and chooses a machine
maximizing its tentative utility uˆj. In this section, we will show that if all jobs are rational,
then the Decentralized Local GreedyMechanism is 3.281-competitive.
5.1 Handling Critical Jobs
Recall that from Section 2.1 on, we assumed that no critical jobs exist, as we defined the
Decentralized Local GreedyMechanism only for jobs j with rj ≥ α pj. We will
now relax this assumption and allow jobs to have types from the more general type space
{(rj, pj, wj)|rj ≥ 0, pj ≥ 0, wj ∈ R}. Without the assumption, the DecentralizedLocal
GreedyMechanism as stated above does not yet yield a constant performance ratio; simple
examples can be constructed in the same flavor as by Megow and Schulz (2004). In fact,
it is well known that early arriving jobs with large processing times have to be delayed
(Anderson and Potts 2004; Megow and Schulz 2004; Megow et al. 2006). In order to achieve
a constant performance ratio, we also adopt this idea and use modified release dates as
Megow and Schulz (2004) and Megow et al. (2006). To this end, we define the modified
release date of every job j ∈ J as r′j = max{rj, αpj}, where α ∈ (0, 1] will later be chosen
appropriately. For our decentralized setting, this means that a machine will not admit
any job j to its priority queue before time max{r˜j, αp˜j} if j arrives at time r˜j and reports
processing time p˜j. Moreover, machines refuse to provide information about the tentative
completion time and payment to a job before its modified release date (with respect to the
job’s reported data). Note that this modification is part of the local scheduling policy of
every machine and therefore does not restrict the required decentralization. Note further
that any myopic rational job j still reports w˜j = wj according to Theorem 4.1 and that a
rational job reports p˜j = pj as well as communicates to machines at the earliest opportunity,
i.e. at time max{rj, αpj}, according to the arguments in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Moreover,
the aforementioned properties concerning the balanced budget, the conservation of utility in
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the case of a truthfully reported weight, and the online property of the payments still apply
to the algorithm with modified release dates.
5.2 Proof of the Competitive Ratio
It is not a goal in itself to have a truthful mechanism, but to use the truthfulness in order
to achieve a reasonable overall performance in terms of the social welfare
∑
wj Cj.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose every job is rational in the sense that it reports rj, pj, wj and selects
a machine that maximizes its tentative utility at arrival. Then the Decentralized Local
GreedyMechanism is %-competitive, with % = 3.281.
The proof of the theorem partly follows the lines of the corresponding proof by Megow
et al. (2006). But the distribution of jobs over machines in their algorithm differs. Therefore,
our result is not implied by the result by Megow et al. (2006) and it is necessary to give a
proof here; it is presented in the appendix.
6 On Dominant Strategy Equilibria
We show that any mechanism that has a dominant strategy equilibrium with truthful re-
ports must necessarily differ from the Decentralized Local GreedyMechanism in the
allocation of jobs to machines and time slots; so it remains unclear what the performance
of such a mechanism might be. Giving up on decentralization, however, we show that it is
possible to define a constant competitive mechanism on the basis of the algorithm by Cor-
rea and Wagner (2005) such that truthtelling is a dominant strategy equilibrium. Finally,
notice that for the single machine case, decentralization is not an issue. We comment on
the Correa-Wagner Algorithm for the single machine case and show that also the Local
Greedy Algorithm can be made truthful with respect to the stronger dominant strategy
equilibrium. The payment scheme required to achieve that, however, is different from the
payment scheme of the Decentralized Local GreedyMechanism.
6.1 A Negative Result
Recall that in the Local Greedy algorithm, jobs are centrally assigned to machines such as
to minimize the increase in the global objective function
∑
wjCj. We can see this algorithm
as the allocation algorithm of a mechanism where the only action of any job is to report
its type. Recall that such mechanisms are known as direct revelation mechanisms. In that
context, a truthful (direct revelation) mechanism denotes a mechanism where truthtelling is
a dominant strategy equilibrium. The question arises if the Local Greedy algorithm can
be augmented by some payment scheme to a truthful mechanism. For the case of parallel
machines, however, we have the following negative result.
Theorem 6.1. There does not exist a payment scheme that extends the Local Greedy algo-
rithm to a truthful mechanism.
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Proof. We first derive a necessary condition for making truthful reports a dominant strategy
equilibrium, and then show that it is violated by the Local Greedy Algorithm. Suppose
there is a payment scheme pi such that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for each
job. Fix job j and the reports of all other jobs. Let also j’s report about processing
time and release date be fixed. Consider two weights of j, w(1) and w(2), and denote by
C(1) and C(2) the resulting completion times and by pi(1) and pi(2) the resulting payments
when j reports w(1) and w(2), respectively. As truthful reporting is a dominant strategy,
reporting w(1) must maximize j’s ex-post utility when j has true weight w(1), especially,
−w(1)C(1) − pi(1) ≥ −w(1)C(2) − pi(2). Similarly, −w(2)C(2) − pi(2) ≥ −w(2)C(1) − pi(1). Adding
up these two inequalities yields
(w(2) − w(1))(C(1) − C(2)) ≥ 0. (1)
Especially, if w(1) < w(2) we must have C(1) ≥ C(2).7
Consider now the following example. Let [w˜/p˜] denote a job with (reported ) weight w˜
and (reported ) processing time p˜. Suppose that we have to schedule the following four jobs
on two machines: [6/3], [5/4], j = [w˜/1
7
], [20/4], where w˜ is a parameter. Let all jobs have
a common release date large enough such that no job has to be delayed according to the
modified release dates (say r > 4α, with α as in Section 5.1), but assume that they arrive
in the given order.
The first job [6/3] increases the objective value on both machines by the same amount
and is therefore scheduled on the first machine. The second job [5/4] is then assigned to the
second machine. We consider two values for the weight of j, namely w(1) = 1
14
and w(2) = 1
2
.
In the first case the weight over processing time ratio is 1
2
and therefore smaller than the
respective ratios of the two jobs already assigned to machines. Thus, j would be scheduled
last on each of the machines according to the WSPT rule. It would cause the following
increases:
z(j, 1) = (r +
1
7
+ 3)w(1)
z(j, 2) = (r +
1
7
+ 4)w(1).
Therefore, j is assigned to the end of machine 1.
The second case for w(2) = 1
2
yields a ratio of 7
2
, which would place j first on both
machines. The respective increases are:
z(j, 1) = (r +
1
7
)w(2) + 6 · 1
7
z(j, 2) = (r +
1
7
)w(2) + 5 · 1
7
.
Job j would be scheduled on machine 2.
The last job [20/4] has a ratio larger than all the ratios of the present jobs. Therefore
it would be scheduled first on both machines. In both cases the total weight of jobs on the
7Condition (1) corresponds to the notion of weak monotonicity as introduced by Bikhchandani, Chatterjee,
Lavi, Mu’alem, Nisan, and Sen (2006). Furthermore, in the single parameter setting, where only the weights
are private information, it is equivalent to the decreasing work curves condition by Archer and Tardos (2001).
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first machine is larger than the total weight of jobs on the second machine. Therefore the
increase in the objective value caused by the last job is in both cases smaller on the second
machine. Thus the job is scheduled on the second machine, which increases j ’s completion
time only in the second case. Thus, j is completed at time r + 3 + 1
7
when reporting 1
14
and
at time r + 4 + 1
7
when reporting 1
2
. Hence, condition (1) is violated.
Remark 6.1. Theorem 6.1 does not depend on the fact that pj and rj are private informa-
tion. Hence, even if only the weights are private and the other job characteristics are public,
the LocalGreedy Algorithm cannot be augmented to a truthful mechanism.
6.2 On the Correa–Wagner Algorithm
As mentioned in the introduction, the currently best known performance guarantee for the
regarded online scheduling problem is 2.62 due to Correa and Wagner (2005). In this section,
we show how this algorithm can be used to obtain a centralized mechanism that admits a
dominant strategy equilibrium where all jobs report truthfully.
The Correa-Wagner algorithm maintains a virtual single machine that can process jobs
m times faster than the original machines. The virtual machine preemptively processes at
any point in time the available job with the highest wj/pj ratio. For a α ∈ [0, 1], the α-point
of a job is defined as the point in time, when for the first time an α-fraction of the job is
processed on the virtual machine. Jobs enter a FIFO-queue in the order of their α-points.
Whenever one of the m ’real’ machines becomes idle, it starts processing the next job from
the FIFO-queue. The mentioned performance bound is achieved by choosing α = (
√
5−1)/2.
Theorem 6.2. For the parallel machine problem, consider a fixed job j and let the reports of
the other jobs be fixed as well. For given reports p˜j and r˜j, let C
0 ≤ · · · ≤ Ck ≤ · · · ≤ CMAX
be the (finitely many ) possible values for j’s completion time when j varies its report w˜j.
Let furthermore %ξ = inf{w | report w leads to Cξ−1} and define
σkj =
MAX∑
ξ=k+1
[%ξ (Cξ − Cξ−1)]
to be the payment that j has to pay if j’s completion time is Ck. Then the Correa–Wagner
Algorithm together with the payment scheme σ has a dominant strategy equilibrium in which
all jobs are truthful.
The payment scheme σ is under certain conditions related to the VCG-payment scheme.
But especially in an online setting, this relationship does not hold; see Section 6.3.
For the induced single parameter problem, where only weights are private information,
the result in Archer and Tardos (2001) implies that a sufficient condition for the existence of
a truthful payment scheme is that the completion time of each job depends non-increasingly
on the job’s reported weight. For the Correa–Wagner Algorithm, indeed a higher report for
the weight can only improve a job’s priority on the virtual machine and therefore can only
decrease the completion time of the job. Therefore, the existence of a payment scheme that
makes truth-telling wj a dominant strategy (for fixed processing time and release date) is
guaranteed by the result of Archer and Tardos (2001). The above defined payments can
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be obtained using the methods by Gui, Mu¨ller, and Vohra (2004) or by Archer and Tardos
(2001). Here, we only show that the payments σkj indeed make truth-telling a dominant
strategy with respect to all three job characteristics.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Fix a job j and the reports of the other jobs. For given reports p˜j
and r˜j of job j, let C(wj) denote j’s completion time as a function of the reported weight
wj. As mentioned above, C(wj) is a non-increasing function, in fact it is a non-increasing
step function. With that insight, it can be easily verified that if j achieves Ck under report
wj, then the payment satisfies
σkj =
∫ wj
0
(C(x)− C(wj)) dx.
Suppose that j has true weight wj and let w˜j > wj be some untruthful report. Then the
corresponding incentive constraint reads as
−wjC(wj)−
∫ wj
0
(C(x)− C(wj)) dx ≥ −wjC(w˜j)−
∫ w˜j
0
(C(x)− C(w˜j)) dx,
which is equivalent to ∫ w˜j
wj
(C(x)− C(w˜j)) dx ≥ 0.
The latter is true, since C(·) is non-increasing and thus the integrand is non-negative. For
w˜j < wj, the corresponding incentive constraint can be verified similarly.
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From the above analysis follows that truthfully reporting the weight is a dominant strat-
egy for job j, no matter what reports j makes about its processing time and release date.
Let us now turn to j’s processing time. For the true processing time pj and fixed release
date, let C(wj), wj ≥ 0 be the completion time for weight report wj. Define C˜(wj) analo-
gously for some untruthful processing time p˜j > pj. Clearly, C˜(wj) ≥ C(wj) for all wj. The
corresponding incentive constraint with respect to processing times reads as
−wjC(wj)−
∫ wj
0
(C(x)− C(wj)) dx ≥ −wjC˜(wj)−
∫ wj
0
(
C˜(x)− C˜(wj)
)
dx
⇔
∫ wj
0
(
C˜(x)− C(x)
)
dx ≥ 0.
The latter is implied by C˜(x) ≥ C(x) for all x > 0.
It remains to show that arriving no later than the true release date is a weakly dominant
strategy, too. Assume j’s report is truthful in wj and pj. For fixed processing time pj and
fixed release date rj, let C(wj), wj ≥ 0 be the completion time for weight report wj. Define
C˜(wj) analogously for release date r˜j. Clearly, C˜(wj) ≥ C(wj) for all wj. This implies the
incentive constraints with respect to the release date similar to the above.
8For a similar, but more intuitive proof for the induced single parameter problem we refer to Lavi (2007).
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The payments σkj can be computed in polynomial time, which can be seen as follows. For
every job j, given the actual reports of the other jobs and j’s report about processing time
and release date, it is sufficient to know j’s completion time as a function of the reported
weight in order to determine the payments. It can be easily verified that this function is a
non-increasing step function whose points of discontinuity are a subset of the set of reported
ratios w`/p` for the n− 1 jobs ` 6= j. Therefore, it is sufficient to determine j’s completion
time for n values of j’s weight. Determining the completion time for one of these values
requires running the Correa-Wagner algorithm once again and thus takes polynomial time.
Hence, determining the payments for all n jobs can be done in polynomial time, too.
However, the payment scheme σ is not an online payment scheme and it does not satisfy
the balanced budget condition. The described mechanism is heavily dependent on central-
ization in maintaining the fast virtual machine and the FIFO-queue. Therefore, we hardly
see a chance to turn the mechanism into a decentralized one.
6.3 The Single Machine Case
For a single machine, the decentralization requirement is redundant. In this case, the Correa-
Wagner algorithm is equivalent to the algorithm by Goemans, Queyranne, Schulz, Skutella,
and Wang (2002), which yields a performance guarantee of 2.42. This way, we get a truthful
mechanism with performance guarantee 2.42.
Although this is better than the performance guarantee of 3 for the Local Greedy
Algorithm on a single machine (see Megow and Schulz 2004), we briefly comment on the
latter, too. Even for a single machine, the Decentralized Local GreedyMechanism
does in general not have a dominant strategy equilibrium where all jobs report truthfully:
Consider a job j with wj = pj = 1 arriving first and a job k with wk = 2 and pk = 1 arriving
second. Suppose that both jobs report truthfully. Job j is displaced by k and receives a
payment of wjpk = 1. But with any report 1 < w˜j < 2, job j would still be displaced by k,
receiving a higher payment w˜jpk > 1. Even when we give up on a balanced budget and j
does not receive the payment when being displaced by k, j would be better off lying w˜j = 3
and not being displaced at all.
However, the Local Greedy Algorithm together with payment scheme σ from Sec-
tion 6.2 yields a mechanism in which truth-telling becomes a dominant strategy equilibrium.
This can be proven analogously to Theorem 6.2. Again, in contrast to the payment scheme of
the Decentralized Local Greedy mechanism, the payment scheme σ does not satisfy
the balanced budget condition and is not an online payment scheme.
In the offline case with trivial release dates, i.e. when rj = 0 for all j ∈ J , the WSPT
rule minimizes
∑
j∈J wjCj and therefore maximizes the total social welfare. In this case, the
WSPT rule together with payments given by σ coincide with the VCG mechanism: It can
be verified that the payment that job j has to make according to σ equals the product of j’s
processing time and the total weight of the jobs that are processed behind j. This is exactly
the externality that j imposes on the other jobs and therefore equals the VCG-payment.
For the online case with nontrivial release dates, however, an exact algorithm does not exist
(Hoogeveen and Vestjens 1996). Hence it is not possible to set up the VCG mechanism. As
a consequence, neither of the previously discussed mechanisms is the VCG mechanism.
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7 Discussion
We leave it as an open problem to find a decentralized, constant competitive online mecha-
nism where it is a dominant strategy equilibrium to report truthfully. A decentralized algo-
rithm that mimics the Local GreedyAlgorithm is not a candidate, as the latter cannot be
augmented by any payment scheme to a mechanism with a dominant strategy equilibrium.
We have shown that the algorithm with the currently best performance bound for the
non-strategic, centralized setting can be turned into a truthful mechanism with competitive
ratio 2.62. But, the resulting mechanism is not decentralized and the given payment scheme
is not online. Thus, an intriguing open question remains: Is the decentralized setting actually
harder than the setting with central coordination?
Finally, we believe that it would be interesting to identify general rules that allow for a
transformation of centralized algorithms to decentralized mechanisms — our work can be
seen as one instance of such a result.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5.1
Theorem 5.1. Suppose every job is rational in the sense that it reports rj, pj, wj and se-
lects a machine that maximizes its tentative utility at arrival. Then the Decentralized Local
GreedyMechanism is %-competitive, with % = 3.281.
Proof. A rational job communicates to the machines at time max{rj , αpj} and chooses a machine
ij that maximizes its utility upon arrival uˆj(ij). That is, it selects a machine i that minimizes
−uˆj(i) = wjCˆj(i) + pˆij(i) = wj
[
r′j + bi(r
′
j) +
∑
k∈H(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk≥r′j
pk + pj
]
+ pj
∑
k∈L(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk>r
′
j
wk.
This, however, exactly equals the immediate increase of the objective value
∑
wj Cj that is due to
the addition of job j to the schedule. We now claim that we can express the objective value Z of
the resulting schedule as
Z =
∑
j∈J
−uˆj(ij) ,
where ij is the machine selected by job j. Here, it is important to note that −uˆj(ij) does not
express the total (ex-post) contribution of job j to
∑
wj Cj , but only the increase upon arrival
of j on machine ij . However, further contributions of job j to
∑
wj Cj only appear when job j
is displaced by some later arriving job with higher priority, say k. This contribution by job j to∑
wj Cj , however, will be accounted for when adding −uˆk(ik).
Next, since we assume that any job maximizes its utility upon arrival, or equivalently mini-
mizes −uˆj(i) when selecting a machine i, we can apply an averaging argument over the number of
machines, like in Megow et al. (2006), to obtain:
Z ≤
∑
j∈J
1
m
m∑
i=1
−uˆj(i) .
Next, recall that upon arrival of job j on any of the machines i (at time r′j), machine i is blocked
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for time bi(r′j) ≤ r′j/α. Therefore we get, for any j,
1
m
m∑
i=1
−uˆj(i) = wjr′j + wj
m∑
i=1
bi(r′j)
m
+ wj
m∑
i=1
∑
k∈H(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk≥r′j
pk
m
+ wjpj + pj
m∑
i=1
∑
k∈L(j)
k→i
k<j
Sk>r
′
j
wk
m
= wjr′j + wj
m∑
i=1
bi(r′j)
m
+ wj
∑
k∈H(j)
k<j
Sk≥r′j
pk
m
+ wjpj + pj
∑
k∈L(j)
k<j
Sk>r
′
j
wk
m
≤ wjr′j + wj
m∑
i=1
bi(r′j)
m
+ wj
∑
k∈H(j)
k<j
pk
m
+ wjpj + pj
∑
k∈L(j)
k<j
wk
m
≤ wjr′j + wj
r′j
α
+ wj
∑
k∈H(j)
k<j
pk
m
+ wjpj + pj
∑
k∈L(j)
k<j
wk
m
.
Thus,
Z ≤
∑
j∈J
wj(1 +
1
α
)r′j +
∑
j∈J
wj
∑
k∈H(j)
k<j
pk
m
+
∑
j∈J
wjpj +
∑
j∈J
pj
∑
k∈L(j)
k<j
wk
m
The last term can be rewritten as follows:∑
j∈J
pj
∑
k∈L(j)
k<j
wk
m
=
∑
(j,k):
j∈H(k)
k<j
pj
wk
m
=
∑
(j,k):
k∈H(j)
j<k
pk
wj
m
=
∑
j∈J
wj
∑
k∈H(j)
k>j
pk
m
.
Therefore,
Z ≤
∑
j∈J
wj(1 +
1
α
)r′j +
∑
j∈J
wj
∑
k∈H(j)
k<j
pk
m
+
∑
j∈J
wjpj +
∑
j∈J
wj
∑
k∈H(j)
k>j
pk
m
=
∑
j∈J
wj(1 +
1
α
)r′j +
∑
j∈J
wj
∑
k∈H(j)
pk
m
+
m− 1
m
∑
j∈J
wjpj .
Now, we apply a lower bound on the optimal off-line schedule by Eastman, Even, and Isaacs (1964,
Thm. 1), namely
ZOPT ≥
∑
j∈J
wj
∑
k∈H(j)
pk
m
+
m− 1
2m
∑
j∈J
wjpj ,
yielding:
Z ≤ ZOPT +
∑
j∈J
wj(1 +
1
α
)r′j +
m− 1
2m
∑
j∈J
wjpj
≤ ZOPT +
∑
j∈J
wj(1 +
1
α
)(rj + αpj) +
m− 1
2m
∑
j∈J
wjpj
= ZOPT +
∑
j∈J
wj
[
(1 +
1
α
)rj + (1 + α+
m− 1
2m
)pj
]
,
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where in the second inequality rj +αpj is used as an upper bound on r′j . Applying the trivial lower
bound
∑
j∈J wj(rj + pj) ≤ ZOPT , we get:
Z ≤ ZOPT + max
{
1 +
1
α
, 1 + α+
m− 1
2m
}
ZOPT
= 2ZOPT + max
{
1
α
, α+
m− 1
2m
}
ZOPT .
Therefore, we get the performance bound
% = 2 + max
{
1
α
, α+
m− 1
2m
}
.
This can now be optimized for α, which was already done in Megow and Schulz (2004). There it
was shown that % < 3.281 for α = (
√
17m2 − 2m+ 1−m+ 1)/(4m).
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